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Foreword
FRANK B. SWAYZE*
The passage of time has not diminished the achievement repre-
sented by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
History knows of no other international agreement of similar scope
and complexity in the development of which so many states and va-
rying constituencies have been represented. As one who participated,
although comparatively briefly and certainly in a minor way, in the
negotiations which culminated in the Convention, I welcome this op-
portunity to add a few personal thoughts to the Law of the Sea Sym-
posium of the San Diego Law Review.
Recent events have highlighted once more the importance of law
of the sea and the role of the important maritime regimes prescribed
by the Convention. Although perhaps controversial in certain other
respects, the flight of United States aircraft on their mission to
Libya has demonstrated vividly the existence and operability of the
regime of transit passage through straits used for international navi-
gation. The route of the aircraft was depicted repeatedly in the pop-
ular press and broadcast media. Overflight of land territory had been
denied, and the aircraft passed over the Strait of Gibraltar. Spain,
however, claims a twelve-mile territorial sea. Were the regime of in-
nocent passage to have applied in the straits, no right of overflight
would have been present and the international situation at the time
would have become one of even greater complexity. Nevertheless,
flight over the straits actually was accomplished through the exercise
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of the right of transit passage. Several observations may be made in
this regard.
-Routine transits of the Strait of Gibraltar, of all types, obvi-
ously occur frequently and without comment. The unquestioned ex-
ercise of the transit passage right in this instance, subject as it was
to far greater potential notoriety, serves therefore to underscore the
overall legitimacy of these routine incidents of transit passage.
-The overflight of the Strait of Gibraltar drew no noticeable ad-
verse international comment. This suggests recognition of the right
in other straits subject to transit passage, wherever located, as a
matter of customary law. Furthermore, acknowledgement of the via-
bility of transit passage lends credence to the view that state practice
is similarly recognizing other maritime uses compatible with the re-
gimes established by the Convention, including exercise of the free-
doms of navigation and overflight, and related and associated uses
within exclusive economic zones.
-The availability of transit passage, while according substantially
greater deference to legitimate coastal state interests than would be
true in the case of a high seas corridor, in this instance also afforded
certain political benefits. In a tense international situation, the
United States was not required to seek Spanish permission to overfly
the Strait. Of possibly greater importance, Spain was not obliged
either to grant or deny such a request, and thereby was relieved of
concerns over political ramifications.
In connection with these comments, a few more thoughts should
be added regarding United States navigation and overflight exercises
generally. The global economic and political commitments and inter-
ests of the United States require that we seek to preserve and main-
tain internationally recognized maritime rights and freedoms for
ourselves, our allies and our trading partners. These rights and free-
doms benefit many maritime interests of the international commu-
nity at large. It is also important to reemphasize that there is noth-
ing new in this situation and the policies directed toward it. For
years the United States has protested, through diplomatic channels,
those claims to ocean jurisdictions which have been at once excessive
and incompatible with international law. At the same time, United
States naval and air units have routinely exercised maritime rights
and freedoms in a manner commensurate with international law.
This policy has been implemented uniformly and without great fan-
fare among friends, neutrals, and other countries alike.
The rationale for this policy is based upon recognition that the
validity of claims under international law depends upon the practice
of states. If a claim is not honored by state practice, it is not likely to
be pursued with much success. United States navigational and over-
flight exercises in furtherance of this policy in the Gulf of Sidra, of
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course, have drawn considerable attention. Clearly, the Libyan claim
that the Gulf of Sidra constitutes an historic bay has no support in
history, state practice, or law. When so obviously excessive a claim is
made with such notoriety, however, I believe a response is not only
appropriate (and the amount of attention given the response proba-
bly inevitable), but necessary to avoid setting an undesirable prece-
dent regarding similar claims which have been advanced rather more
quietly in other geographic areas.
During the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea, a widely accepted legal regime for the world's oceans was gen-
erally perceived as the preferred vehicle to achieve stability and pre-
dictability, particularly in view of the number of conflicting claims
then existing and continually being issued. The question, therefore,
frequently arises why the United States, with a wide range of its
maritime interests apparently resolved satisfactorily, did not sign the
Convention. The most direct answer is contained in the President's
statement of March 10, 1983: portions of the seabed mining provi-
sions of the Convention were considered contrary to the interests and
principles of industrialized nations, and would not help attain the
aspirations of developing countries. In my own view, the matter is
rather more complex, and involves not only deep seabed mining pro-
visions, but certain aspects of the Conference itself and the dynamics
of the interagency process within the United States government.
The Convention constitutes a remarkable series of compromises,
both large and small, reached throughout the duration of the Con-
ference and affecting the full panoply of subjects under considera-
tion. Obviously, many of the 165 delegations represented a variety of
views, sometimes conflicting. Under these circumstances, it is highly
unlikely the work of the Conference could have been accomplished
at all without the "Gentlemen's Agreement," which permitted all
participants to seek, as far as possible, to reach agreement on mat-
ters of substance by consensus. As a result, however, much of the
substantive work in laying the grounds for consensus was conducted
informally by small groups of interested delegates. At the same time
that this informal process produced agreements ratifiable by the cog-
nizant committees and in plenary, it left behind comparatively little
in the way of a negotiating history. Although delegations conse-
quently were freed from the need to take firm positions in anticipa-
tion of votes on individual issues, there often is no record indicating
what was intended by the participants in producing language to ef-
fect their compromises. Where the language of the Convention is un-
clear, therefore, interpretive guidance may be absent.
This occasional lack of clarity must be considered in combination
with the variety of constituencies contained within the sizeable
United States delegation. Among the agencies represented were the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Interior, Transportation (the Coast
Guard), Commerce (including the National Oceanographic and At-
mospheric Administration), Treasury, and State. In addition, these
agencies themselves often were comprised of several constituent and
not always harmonious interests. For example, a strong voice in
favor of the Convention because of its treatment of a given issue
might be met by an opposing voice or less favorable proponent
within the same agency or within another agency, depending upon
the Convention's treatment, nontreatment, or ambiguity regarding
other issues. Therefore, in my opinion, the United States did not re-
fuse to sign the Convention because of the specific opposition of one
constituent interest. Instead, unclear portions of the Convention it-
self and an incomplete negotiating record, although contributing and
possibly essential to consensus at the Conference, could not com-
mand sufficiently strong proponents within the United States govern-
ment to overcome a forcefully presented opposition.
An illustration that comes quickly to mind deals, once again, with
transit passage. The Convention text fails to provide explicitly for
submerged transit as part of the transit passage right. Whether sub-
merged transit actually is comprehended bythe grant in article 38 of
freedom of navigation and overflight has been the subject of consid-
erable debate. I personally believe this controversy was resolved con-
clusively in favor of submerged transit, by Professor John Norton
Moore in an article appearing in the American Journal of Interna-
tional Law in 1980.1 Nevertheless, existing support for the Conven-
tion within the Department of Defense at the time arguably might
have been stronger had there been no controversy, and had a right of
submerged transit appeared in the text in so many words. How many
times this sort of situation arose among the various United States
government agencies involved in the negotiations is difficult to esti-
mate, but the impact upon the totality of the support for the Con-
vention may well have been substantial.
What then is the likelihood that the United States ultimately will
sign and ratify the Convention? The United States already has indi-
cated that it will respect maritime claims consistent with interna-
tional law as reflected in the Convention, provided that rights and
freedoms of the United States under international law are similarly
respected by coastal states. At this time, however, I believe the
1. Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference of the
Law of the Sea, 74 AM. . INT'L L. 77 (1980).
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chances for signature and ratification are not great. The final answer
may depend in part upon the extent to which Convention provisions
are "fleshed out" by state practice consistent with the broad array of
United States ocean interests. Another factor may be the extent to
which a widely accepted international regime, although unsatisfac-
tory in some respects, is perceived as essential for the orderly ex-
ploitation of the resources of the deep seabed. In any event, it is
clear that the Convention at a minimum has provided an invaluable
framework conducive to a stable and orderly customary legal envi-
ronment for international maritime behavior.

